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Administration of Estates
Administration of Estates; powers of attorney
Civil Code § 2400 (repealed and new); §§ 2400.5, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404,
2405,2406,2407,2410,2411,2412,2412.5,2413,2414,2415,2416,2417,
2418,2419,2420,2421, 2422,2423, 2430,2431, 2432, 2432.5, 2433, 2434,
2435, 2436, 2436.5, 2437, 2438, 2438.5, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443,
2444,2445, 2450,2475, 2476,2477, 2478, 2479, 2480,2480.5,2481, 2482,
2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495,
2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2499.5, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2503.5, 2504,
2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2510, 2510.5, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514 (repealed);
§§ 2355,2356,2357 (amended); Financial Code § 6725 (amended); Probate
Code §§ 3721, 3722, 4000, 4001, 4010, 4014, 4018, 4022, 4026, 4030,
4034, 4050, 4051, 4052, 4053, 4054, 4100, 4101, 4102, 4120, 4121, 4122,
4123, 4124, 4125, 4126, 4127, 4128, 4129, 4130, 4150, 4151, 4152, 4153,
4154, 4155, 4200, 4201, 4202, 4203, 4204, 4205, 4206, 4207, 4230, 4231,
4232, 4233, 4234, 4235, 4236, 4237, 4238, 4260, 4261, 4262, 4263, 4264,
4265, 4266, 4300, 4301, 4302, 4303, 4304, 4305, 4306, 4307, 4308, 4400,
4401, 4402, 4403, 4404, 4405, 4406, 4407, 4408, 4409, 4450, 4451, 4452,
4453, 4454, 4455, 4456, 4457, 4458, 4459, 4460, 4461, 4462, 4463, 4464,
4465, 4600, 4603, 4606, 4609, 4612, 4615, 4618, 4621, 4650, 4651, 4652,
4653, 4654, 4700, 4701, 4702, 4703, 4704, 4720, 4721, 4722, 4723, 4724,
4725, 4726, 4727, 4750, 4751, 4752, 4770, 4771, 4772, 4773, 4774, 4775,
4776, 4777, 4778, 4779, 4900, 4901, 4902, 4903, 4904, 4905, 4920, 4921,
4922,4923,4940,4941,4942,4943,4944,4945,4946, 4947, 4948 (new);
§ 5204 (amended).
SB 1907 (Campbell); 1994 STAT. Ch. 307
Existing law provides for the execution of powers of attorney,' including
durable powers of attorney,2 and durable powers of attorney for health care.3
1. See CAL PROB. CODE § 4022 (enacted by Chapter 307) (defining power of attorney as a written
instrument, executed by a natural person having the capacity to contract, that grants authority to an attorney-in-
fact); Frink v. Roe, 70 Cal. 296, 307 (1886) (stating that an agent's authority or power is his right to act in the
name of or on behalf of another, and this power is conferred by letter of attorney or power of attorney). See
generally Comprehensive Power of Attorney Law, 24 CAL L. REViSION COMM'N REPORTS 111, 121 (1994)
(stating that under SB 1907, the power of attorney statutes are not completely severed from the general agency
rules, and that the general agency provisions have been included in the fabric of SB 1907); 3 AM. JUR. 2d
Agency §§ 23-35 (1986) (discussing powers of attorney in relation to agency law in general); Linda Feldman,
Topics/Seniors; Police Are Pros at Halting Cons Aimed at Elderly; Special Unit of LAPD Works Closely With
the District Attorney's Office to Safeguard Vulnerable Class of Victims, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1994, at J18
(reporting the Los Angeles Police Department's formation of the Elder Persons Estate Unit, a team specializing
in comfbating the crime of the 1990s: preying upon the elderly by securing powers of attorney and taking their
assets).
2. See CAL, PROB. CODE § 4018 (enacted by Chapter 307) (defining durable power of attorney); id.
§ 4124(a)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 307) (listing statements required to create a durable power of attorney); see
also id. § 4026 (enacted by Chapter 307) (defining principal as a natural person who executes a power of
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There are no particular qualifications required for an attorney-in-fact4 under
attorney). See generally Comprehensive Power of Attorney Law, 24 CA.. L. REVISION CoNMI'N REPORTS I11,
119 n.5 (1994) (explaining that durable powers of attorney are available in some form in all 50 states and tie
District of Columbia, and that in Illinois and Oregon all powers of attorney are durable); Michael Gilfix,
Advising Aging Clients, CAL LAW., Sept. 1986. at 50.54 (stating that a durable power of attorney is designed
to avoid the expense and other difficulties inherent in formal conservatorships, and that the device allows an
elderly client to retain control over his or her affairs as long as possible and to choose a legal surrogate to serve
in the event of his or her incapacity); Jeff Share, Taking Care of Elderly's Affairs Tricky; Experts Urge
Planning Ahead with Documents, HOUSTON POST, Sept. 4, 1994, at D2 (declaring that experts agree that
individuals should execute a durable power of attorney, which is much cheaper than seeking to have a guardian
appointed).
3. CAL PROB. CODE §§ 3721-3722, 4000-4001, 4010,4014, 4018, 4022, 4026, 4030, 4034, 4050-
4054,4100-4102,4120-4130,4200-4207,4230-4238,4260-4266, 4300-4308,4400-4409,4450-4465,4600,
4603,4606,4609,4612,4615,4618,4621,4650-4654,4700-4704, 4720-4727,4750-4752,4770-4779,4900-
4905, 4920-4923, 4940-4948, 5204 (enacted by Chapter 307); see id. (amending and re-enacting former
California Civil Code sections relating to the various forms of powers of attorney); see also CAL. PROB, CODB
§ 4606 (enacted by Chapter 307) (defining durable power of attorney for health care as a durable power of
attorney which authorizes an attorney-in-fact to make health care decisions for the principal); id. § 4609
(enacted by Chapter 307) (defining health care as any care, treatment, service, or procedure to maintain,
diagnose, or treat an individual's physical or mental condition and includes decisions affecting the principal
after death); iL § 4612 (enacted by Chapter 307) (defining health care decision as consent, refusal of consent,
or withdrawal of consent to health care, or a decision to begin, continue, increase, limit, discontinue, or not to
begin any health care). See generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1990)
(holding that the United States Constitution does not forbid Missouri from requiring clear and convincing
evidence of an incompetent's wishes for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment). The Court also concluded
that the Due Process Clause does not mandate that a state accept the substituted judgment of close family
members without substantial proof that their views reflect those of the patient. Id. at 284; Michele Yuen,
Comment, Letting Daddy Die: Adopting New Standardsfor Surrogate Decisionmaking, 39 UCLA L Ray. 581,
619-20 (1992) (proposing arbitration in cases where an incapacitated patient's treatment preferences are not
sufficiently clear by documentation, and the physician and family members disagree as to proper treatment);
Sheila S. Nevins, The Durable Power ofAttorney for Health Care: Enhancing the Printed Forms, L.A. LAW.,
Nov. 1991, at 40,45 (stating that the principal of a durable power of attorney for health care should consider
the use of additional instructions, definitions, and restraints on the attorney-in-fact because these efforts to
express desires with precision will not only serve the best interests of the principal, but will satisfy the
expectations of the Legislature and the courts that private decision-making regarding health care can be
successful); Theresa Tighe, Peace of Mind: Elderly Turning to Power of Attorney, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCHl,
Aug. 5, 1994, at IC (reporting that powers of attorney for finances and health care are preferable to
guardianships and conservatorships because: (1) They cost less due to the fact that the creation of a power of
attorney requires no court costs; (2) they can he drawn up by a lawyer in one day unlike a guardianship or
conservatorship, which may take at least a month through the courts; and (3) they protect a family's privacy
by keeping a person's finances and medical history private unlike a guardianship or conservatorship hearing
in which these facts become part of the public record).
4. See CAL PROB. CODE § 4014 (enacted by Chapter 307) (defining attorney-in-fact as a person
granted authority to act for the principal in a power of attorney, and includes a person delegated authority by
an attorney-in-fact or successor to an attorney-in-fact); id. § 4231 (a) (enacted by Chapter 307) (imposing a duty
of care and skill upon the attorney-in-fact); id. § 4232(a) (enacted by Chapter 307) (imposing a duty of loyalty
upon the attorney-in-fact); id. § 4233(a) (enacted by Chapter 307) (requiring the attorney-in-fact to keep the
principal's property separate from other property in a manner adequate to identify the property clearly as
belonging to the principal); id. § 4234 (enacted by Chapter 307) (imposing a duty upon the attorney-in-fact to
keep the principal informed and, unless otherwise approved by the court, to follow the principal's instructions);
id. § 4236(a) (enacted by Chapter 307) (mandating the attorney-in-fact to keep records of all transactions
entered into by the attorney-in-fact on behalf of the principal); see also Haigler v. Donnelly, 18 Cal. 2d 674,
681, 117 P.2d 331, 335 (1941) (stating that a broker or agent is ordinarily liable for converting the funds of
his principal when he refuses to account for such funds upon demand); Sterling v. Smith, 97 Cal. 343, 347, 32
P. 320, 321 (1893) (providing that an agent who invests his principal's money in a corporation of which he is
a member and to which he is largely indebted, without informing her either of his membership or of the debt,
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a power of attorney for property; however, there are some restrictions in the case
of a durable power of attorney for health care Chapter 307 specifies that any
person having the capacity to make a contract may be an attorney-in-fact.6
Existing law mandates that powers of attorney be in writing and signed by the
principal.7 Chapter 307 imposes the additional requirement that powers of
is guilty of fraud, though there may be no actual wrongful intent; and the principal may recover such sum from
the agent in the absence of a ratification by her of such an investment); Whittaker v. Otto, 188 Cal. App. 2d
619, 623, 10 Cal. Rptr. 689, 692 (1961) (stating that an agent may be authorized to carry forward any ordinary
business transaction, and the agent's act becomes the act of his principal); People v. Warrington, 80 Cal. App.
167, 171,251 P. 327, 328 (1926) (providing that a general power of attorney does not authorize an agent to
divert funds entrusted to him for a specific purpose); RasTATMErr (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 6 cmt. a (1958)
(defining power as a legal attribute or an ability to change legal relations). See generally Sigvald Nielson, The
Power of an Agent to Bind His Principal-California nd the Restatement, 22 CAL. L. REV. 392 (1934)
(discussing the bases of an agent's power to bind a principal under California law).
5. Comprehensive Power of Attorney Law, 24 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 111, 125 (1994);
see CAL. PROB. CODE § 4702 (enacted by Chapter 307) (enumerating limitations restricting who may be an
attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney for health care).
6. CAL PROB. CODE § 4200 (enacted by Chapter 307); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1556 (West 1982)
(providing that all persons are capable of contracting except minors, persons of unsound mind, and persons
deprived of civil rights); Rosman v. Cuevas, 176 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 867, 869, 1 Cal. Rptr. 485, 487 (1960)
(stating that in any contract, there must exist parties competent to enter into a contract as well as a mutual
understanding of what is being done); Comprehensive Power of Attorney Law, 24 CAL L. REVISION COMIm'N
REPORTS 111, 125-26 (1994) (stating that a minimum criterion for an attorney-in-fact is that the person has the
capacity to contract). Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 4200 (enacted by Chapter 307) (explaining that only a
person having the capacity to contract is qualified to act as an attorney-in-fact) with 1985 Cal. Stat. ch. 403,
sec. 1, at 1597 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 2400) (providing that a durable power of attorney is a power of
attorney by which a principal designates merely "another," imposing no particular qualifications upon the
attorney-in-fact). See generally George J. Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, From Contract to Status Via
Psychiatry, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 537,538(1973) (tracing the relationship between the right to contract and
mental competence to the Romans, calling the capacity to consent, which is essential to contract formation,
a "mental" quality that may be impaired by mental illness); Henry Weihofen, Mental Incompetency to Contract
or Convey, 39 S. CAL L. REV. 211, 211 (1966) (stating that all courts agree that a declaration of incompetency
is sufficient to conclude that the person was incompetent to contract at the time of the adjudication). However,
there are differing views as to whether the determination is conclusive of the person's incompetency at some
time subsequent thereto. Id.; James T. Bentson, Comment, Convicts-Loss of Civil Rights-Civil Death in
California, 26 S. CAL L. REV. 425, 430 (1953) (stating that although California Civil Code § 1556 declares
that all persons are capable of contracting except, inter alia, persons deprived of civil rights, the courts have
often found a restoration of the right to contract for certain personal services); 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts §
23 (1991) (discussing capacity to contract generally); 14 CAL. JtJR. 3D Contracts § 9 (1974) (discussing
capacity to contract in California generally); 14 CAL JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 283 (1954) (stating that no
person convicted of an infamous crime is competent to serve as executor or administrator). But see
RESATSM"T(SECOND) OFAGENCY § 6 cmt. b (1958) (stating that any person may hold a power, regardless
of that person's legal capacity to contract or to be subject to liability). Although a person does not have the
legal capacity to bind himself, he has the power to bind another if he is authorized to act on the other's behalf.
Id.
7. CAL PROB. CODE § 4121(b) (enacted by Chapter 307); see id. § 4022 (enacted by Chapter 307)
(requiring that a power of attorney be in writing). Compare id. § 4121(a)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 307) (setting
forth the formalities for executing a power of attorney including: the date of its execution, the signature of the
principal or some other person who is in the principal's presence and is directed to sign for him by the
principal, and the power of attorney is either acknowledged by a notary public or signed by at least two
witnesses who satisfy the requirements of California Probate Code § 4122) with 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 178,
see. 3, at 722 (amending CAL CIv. CODE § 2476) (requiring that the signature of the principal on the uniform
statutory form power of attorney be acknowledged) and 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1090, sec. 1, at 4394
(amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 2475) (providing the uniform statutory form power of attorney which requires
the signature and social, security number of the principal). See generally Comprehensive Power of Attorney
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attorney contain at least two witnesses' signatures or an acknowledgement by a
notary public. 8
Existing law does not provide a specific means by which an attorney-in-fact
may resign;9 nor does existing law address a specific means by which an attorney-
in-fact may receive compensation.'0 Chapter 307 specifies that attorneys-
Law, 24 CAL L. REvISION COMM'N REPORTS 111, 124 (1994) (stating that there is no requirement that the
attorney-in-fact sign the instrument); David Bailey, Bank Liable in Bogus Agency Scheme, CH. DAILY L.
BULL, Mar. 17, 1994, at 3 (reporting that a Chicago bank must repay $12,538 that was originally in an elderly
woman's bank account, but was unlawfully acquired by her nephew who used forged power of attorney forms);
Ken Hoover, Convict Pleads Guilty to Harassment, S.F. CHRON., May 7, 1994, at A19 (reporting a story in
which a convicted child molester exacted revenge upon the woman who turned him in by intercepting her mail
and forging power of attorney forms in her name with the IRS); Preying on the Elderly?, PLAIN DEALER, Aug.
14, 1994, at 2C (describing a story in which two elderly sisters' bank account was emptied and their house was
sold for slightly more than half its worth prompting the police to investigate whether the sisters were deceived
by their nephew into signing away their affairs under a power of attorney or whether he forged the documents).
8. CAL PROB. CODE § 4121(c) (enacted by Chapter 307); see id. § 4122 (enacted by Chapter 307)
(specifying that if the power of attorney is signed by witnesses, the witnesses must be adults; the attorney-in-
fact may not act as a witness; and that each witness signing the power of attorney must witness either the
signing of the instrument by the principal or the principal's acknowledgment of the signature or the power of
attorney); id. § 4401 (enacted by Chapter 307) (providing the statutory form power of attorney indicating the
mandatory inclusion of a certificate of acknowledgment of notary public in compliance with California Civil
Code § 1189); id. § 4402(c) (enacted by Chapter 307) (requiring, as one element of a legally sufficient
document, the signature of the principal on the statutory form power of attorney be acknowledged); id. §
4701(a) (enacted by Chapter 307) (providing that none of the following persons may act as a witness for a
durable power of attorney for health care: the principal's health care provider or an employee of the principal's
health care provider, the operator or an employee of a community care facility, or the operator or an employee
of a residential care facility for the elderly); id. § 4701(b) (enacted by Chapter 307) (requiring each witness to
make a declaration which states that the principal's identity was proven to the witness); id. § 4751 (enacted
by Chapter 307) (defining convincing evidence for the purposes of California Probate Code § 4701(b)); Id. §
4771 (enacted by Chapter 307) (setting forth the statutory form durable power of attorney for health care which
requires the signatures of two qualified witnesses); id. § 4773(a) (enacted by Chapter 307) (setting forth the
formal requirements of a durable power of attorney for health care, including the signature of two qualified
witnesses); see also CAL CIV. CODE § 1216 (West 1982) (declaring that no power contained in an instrument
to convey or execute instruments affecting real property which has been recorded is revoked by any act of the
party by whom it was executed, unless the instrument containing the revocation is acknowledged and recorded
in the same office in which the instrument containing the power was recorded); cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 523.01
(West Supp. 1994) (requiring the power of attorney to be notarized only when the principal signs by a mark
or someone signs the power of attorney on behalf of the principal). See generally Comprehensive Power of
Attorney Law, 24 CAL. L. REvSION COMM'N REPORTs 111, 125 (1994) (providing a protective level of
formality for durable powers of attorney by requiring witness signatures or notary acknowledgments).
9. CAL CIV. CODE § 2355 (amended by Chapter 307); see id. (providing the means by which an
agency may terminate); Boehm v. Spreckels, 183 Cal. 239, 248, 191 P.5, 9 (1920) (providing that where an
agent's power is coupled with an interest, the power to revoke always exists under California Civil Code §
2355, but the right to revoke without damages depends upon the circumstances); Jay v. Dollarhide, 3 Cal. App.
3d 1001, 1022, 84 Cal. Rptr. 538, 551 (1970) (stating the general rule that a power of attorney is a form of
agency); Preszler v. Dudley, 153 Cal. App. 2d 120, 123, 314 P.2d 138, 141 (1957) (explaining that an agency
usually depends on the assent of both parties and hence may be revoked by the principal or renounced by the
agent at any time); see also 2 Am. JUR. 2D Agency §§ 59-60 (1991) (providing the general rule that one form
of agency is a power of attorney); cf. Moore v. Scott, 759 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Ky. 1988) (holding that a power
of attorney could be revoked, even though the power of attorney had an expiration date subsequent to the
revocation).
10. CAL CIV. CODE § 2308 (West 1985); see id. (stating that consideration is not necessary to make
an authority binding upon the principal); Comprehensive Power of Attorney Law, 24 CAL. L. REVISION
COMI'N REPORTS 111, 134 (1994) (declaring that existing law does not provide any provisions on
compensation of attorneys-in-fact); Rodes v. Shannon, 222 Cal. App. 2d 721, 726, 35 Cal. Rptr. 339, 343
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 26
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in-fact are entitled to reasonable compensation." Chapter 307 also enumerates
methods by which an attorney-in-fact may resign.1
2
Existing law is silent on the extent to which an attorney-in-fact may delegate
authority under a power of attorney for property.' 3 Similar to the general agency
statutes, Chapter 307 permits the delegation of mechanical acts; however, unlike
the general agency rule, the attorney-in-fact remains responsible to the principal
for the exercise of the authority delegated. 14 Chapter 307 further specifies that in
(1963) (declaring that a gratuitous agent owes the same obligation as any other agent with respect to the
exercise of good faith); Spector v. Miller, 199 Cal. App. 2d 87,95, 18 Cal. Rptr. 426,431 (1962) (providing
that a gratuitous agent cannot be compelled to perform his undertaking, but if he actually enters upon
performance, he must obey instructions and he is bound to exercise the utmost good faith in dealing with the
principal); Lem v. Wilson, 27 Cal. App. 512,514, 150 P. 641,642 (1915) (mandating that a gratuitous agent
appointed to sell pledged property is liable to the pledgor for gross negligence resulting in loss); see also
Comprehensive Power of Attorney Law, 24 CAL. L. REVISION CoMM'N REPORTS 111, 134 (1994) (explaining
that the omission of a right to compensation in prior law might have caused the failure of a durable power of
attorney to carry out its intended purpose, since the attorney-in-fact may have been unwilling to continue
service without compensation or reimbursement, if he or she was expected to incur substantial expenditures
of time and money if the principal became incompetent); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 441 (1958)
(stating that unless the relation of the parties, the triviality of the services, or other circumstances, indicate that
the parties have agreed otherwise, it is inferred that a person promises to pay for services which he requests
or permits another to perform for him as his agent).
11. CAL PROa. CODE § 4204 (enacted by Chapter 307); see id. § 4231(b) (enacted by Chapter 307)
(providing that if an attomey-in-fact does not receive compensation, the attorney-in-fact is not liable for any
loss to the principal's property, unless the loss is a result of the attorney-in-fact's bad faith, intentional
wrongdoing, or gross negligence).
12. Id § 4207 (enacted by Chapter 307); see id. § 4207(a) (enacted by Chapter 307) (providing that an
attomey-in-fact may resign by. (1) Giving notice to the principal, if the principal is competent; (2) giving notice
to the conservator, if a conservator has been appointed; (3) providing a written agreement of a successor who
is designated in the power of attorney; or (4) pursuant to a court order); see also id. § 4238 (enacted by Chapter
307) (enumerating the duties of an attorney-in-fact upon the termination of his or her authority); id. § 4941(e)
(enacted by Chapter 307) (providing that a petition may be filed for the purpose of approving the resignation
power of attorney other than a durable power of attorney for health care).
13. Comprehensive Power of Attorney Law, 24 CAL L. REVIsION COmM'N REPORTS 111, 130 (1994);
see CAL. CtV. CODE § 2349 (West 1985) (allowing the agent, under general agency law, to delegate his powers:
(I) When the act to be done is purely mechanical; (2) when the act may not be legally performed by the agent,
but may be legally performed by the sub-agent; (3) when it is customary to delegate such a power, or (4) when
delegation is explicitly authorized by the principal); Sayre v. Nichols, 7 Cal. 535,542 (1858) (explaining that
an agent may not delegate any of his powers requiring the exercise ofjudgment or discretion, but may delegate
mere mechanical powers or duties); Kadota Fig Ass'n of Producers v. Case-Swayne Co., 73 Cal. App. 2d 815,
819, 167 P.2d 523, 526 (1946) (mandating that in the absence of explicit authority to do so, an agent may not
delegate the power to another to pass upon the terms of a contract or to bind the principal by its unauthorized
execution, however, the agent may nevertheless delegate to another the power to perform purely mechanical
acts in relation to the contract); Julian v. Schwartz, 16 Cal. App. 2d 310, 328, 60 P.2d 887, 897 (1936) (stating
that implied authority may exist for an agent to handle his principal's business in the usual and customary
manner employed in the same or similar locality).
14. CAL. PRoa. CODE § 4205 (enacted by Chapter 307); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 18
(1958) (declaring that in general, an agent is not permitted to delegate the exercise of discretion in the use of
a power which is held for the benefit of the principal); id. § 18 cmt. b (1958) (explaining that it is uncommon
for an agent to authorize a person to conduct a transaction as well as to confer the power to exercise discretion
in the principal's matters); id. § 64 (1958) (providing that authority to buy or sell includes the authority to hire
necessary professionals or other assistants); id. § 77 (1958) (stating that the authority to appoint agents,
subagents, or subservants of the principal can be conveyed in the same manner as authority to do other acts
for the principal); id. § 78 (1958) (providing that the authority to conduct a transaction includes the authority
to delegate incidental mechanical and ministerial acts but does not include the authority to delegate the
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addition to acts authorized under a general grant of authority, 5 the attorney-in-
fact also has the inferred authority to perform tasks necessary to carry out the
specific tasks in a power of attorney.
16
Chapter 307 additionally clarifies and reorganizes the provisions for the
termination and revocation of the attorney-in-fact's authority. 7 Chapter 307
imposes a general duty upon third persons to grant an attorney-in-fact the same
rights as would be granted to the principal. 8
performance of incidental acts which involve discretion or the agent's special skill).
15. See Comprehensive Power of Attorney Law, 24 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTs 111, 129
(1994) (stating that the general agency statutes provide for the power and authority of attorneys-in-fact); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2307 (West 1985) (specifying that a preceding authorization or a subsequent ratification may
confer authority or create an agency); id. § 2315 (West 1985) (providing that an agent has as much authority
as is conferred by the principal); id. § 2316 (West 1985) (defining actual authority as either that which a
principal intentionally confers upon the agent, or allows the agent to believe himself to possess); id. § 2318
(West 1985) (providing that every agent has as much authority as is provided by general agency law, unless
specially deprived by the principal); id. § 2322 (West Supp. 1994) (explaining that general authority does not
authorize the agent to act in his or her own name, unless it is in the usual course of business to do so; to define
the scope of the agency; or, to violate basic fiduciary duties imposed on a trustee).
16. CAL PROB. CODE § 4261 (enacted by Chapter 307); see id. (providing that an attorney-in-fact has
the same authority as any other person who has the capacity to contract if the power of attorney grants general
authority to an attorney-in-fact and is not limited to specific actions); id. § 4262 (enacted by Chapter 307)
(explaining limited power of attorney as a power granted to an attorney-in-fact, which gives the agent the
authority incidental, necessary, or proper to carry out the granted authority); see also CAL. ClV. CODE § 2319
(West 1985) (granting the agent the necessary authority to satisfy the purpose of the agency); id. § 2320 (West
1985) (allowing the agent to disobey instructions where the interest of the principal will benefit and there is
no time to communicate with the principal); id. § 2321 (Vest 1985) (stating that when an authority is given
partly in general and partly in specific terms, the general authority does not provide any higher power than that
which is specifically mentioned); Comprehensive Power of Attorney Law, 24 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N
REPORTS 111, 129-30 (1994) (stating that the intent of SB 1907 is to clarify a general grant of authority or
limited authority, not to create a new set of powers); supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing the
power of an agent to delegate the authority conferred by the principal under general agency statutes and
Chapter 307).
17. Comprehensive Power ofAtorney Law, 24 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 111, 136 (1994);
see id. (stating that although SB 1907 reorganizes and combines the rules for termination and revocation of
powers of attorney, it preserves most of their substance); see, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4 150(a) (enacted by
Chapter 307) (allowing a principal to modify a power of attorney either in accordance with its terms or by an
instrument executed in the same manner as the power of attorney); id. § 4151(a) (enacted by Chapter 307)
(providing that a principal may revoke a power of attorney in accordance with the terms of the power of
attorney or by a writing); id. § 4152 (enacted by Chapter 307) (enumerating events by which the authority of
an attorney-in-fact is terminated); id. § 4153(a) (enacted by Chapter 307) (setting forth methods by which a
principal may revoke the authority of the attorney-in-fact); id. § 4154(a) (enacted by Chapter 307) (stating that
a spouse's designation as an attorney-in-fact is revoked at the dissolution or annulment of the marriage); Id.
§ 4155(a) (enacted by Chapter 307) (providing that the authority of an attorney-in-fact under a nondurable
power of attorney is terminated by the incapacity of the principal to contract).
18. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4300 (enacted by Chapter 307); see id. § 4301 (enacted by Chapter 307)
(permitting a third party to rely on, contract with, and deal with an atorney-in-fact with respact to the subjects
and purposes included in the power of attorney, regardless of whether the power of attorney expressly
authorizes the act); id. § 4302 (enacted by Chapter 307) (authorizing a third person, before incurring any duty
to comply with the power of attorney, to require the attorney-in-fact to provide identification); id. § 4303(a)
(enacted by Chapter 307) (providing that a third person who acts in good faith reliance on a power of attorney
is not liable to the principal or to any other person if the power of attorney is presented by the attorney-in-fact
designated in the power of attorney, the power of attorney appears on its face to be valid, and the power of
attorney includes a notary public's certificate of acknowledgement or is signed by two witnesses);
Comprehensive Power of Attorney Law, 24 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 111, 139 (1994) (explaining
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LITERPRETIVE COMMENT
The purpose of Chapter 307 is to enact a new comprehensive Power of
Attorney Law in the California Probate Code.' The new law transfers the
provisions governing powers of attorney from the California Civil Code to the
Probate Code.20 According to the California Law Revision Commission, prior to
the enactment of Chapter 307, the statutes governing powers of attorney were
completely disorganized and were in need of amendments and modifications.2 '
In the past fifteen years, a great deal of legislation has been enacted recognizing
general durable powers of attorney and durable powers of attorney for health
care.22 The piecemeal nature of these revisions has culminated in a disorganized
set of statutes relating directly to powers of attorney.2 In many situations, it is
difficult to ascertain whether a particular provision applies to powers of attorney
generally, to durable powers generally, or only to health care powers.24 In
addition, it is unclear the degree to which the different varieties of powers of
attorney are subject to general agency rules.2
Chapter 307 did not completely sever the power of attorney statutes from the
general agency rules; thus, powers of attorney are still considered a form of
agency and will remain subject to the general law of agency, except in situations
where the Power of Attorney Law applies.26 Much of Chapter 307 was drafted
with the intent to provide a more explicit set of rules and to fill gaps in existing
coverage, rather that making any major substantive revisions.2
Sean Arther/Carin C. Azarcon
that in order to facilitate compliance with the duty of all third parties to afford an attorney-in-fact the same
rights and privileges given to the principal, SB 1907 protects third parties acting in good faith and those relying
on the representations of the attorney-in-fact).
19. SENATE RULES COMMrEE, COMMITrEEANALYSIS OFSB 1907, at 2 (June 30, 1994).
20. Id. at 1; see supra note 3 and accompanying text (enumerating the transferred provisions).
21. Comprehensive Power ofAttorney Law, 24 CAL. L. REViSlON COMM'N REPORTS 111, 117 (1994).
22. Id.; see id. at 117 n.2 (explaining that almost all of the recent durable power of attorney legislation
was enacted based on the recommendation of the Law Revision Commission).
23. Id. at 118; cf. id. at 118 n.3 (providing that of the 51 sections relating to agency law which were
present in the California Civil Code of 1872, only four have been revised in 120 years).
24. Id. at 118; see id. at 119 n.4 (explaining that many of the general agency statutes overlap or are
concerned with issues which are either irrelevant or handled differently in the power of attorney statutes).
25. Id. at 118.
26. Id. at 121.
27. Id. at 122.
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Code of Civil Procedure § 366.2 (amended); Probate Code §§ 19255, 21320,
21351 (amended).
AB 797 (Connolly); 1994 STAT. Ch. 40
(Effective April 19, 1994)
Existing law, subject to certain exceptions, invalidates an instrument' which
attempts to make a donative transfer to a beneficiaryf who was instrumental in
creating or drafting the instrument or who has a particular relationship with the
drafter.3 Under existing law, certain transfers are exempt from these invalidating
provisions, including transfers made to a blood relation or a co-habitant,
transfers reviewed by an independent attorney,6 and transfers approved by the
court.' Chapter 40 creates an additional exception to the invalidating provision
1. See CAt. PROB. CODE § 45 (West 1991) (defining instrument as a will, trust, deed, or other writing
which designates a beneficiary or otherwise makes a donative transfer of property).
2. See iU § 24 (West 1991) (defining beneficiary as a person to whom a donative transfer of property
is made or that person's successor in interest).
3. Id. § 21350(a)(1)-(3) (Vest Supp. 1994); see id. (noting that provisions which make donative
transfers are invalid if the transfer is made to, among others, a person having a fiduciary relationship, an
employee of the drafter or transcriber, or any partner or shareholder of any partnership or corporation in which
the drafter has a 10% or greater ownership interest); In re Schuyler, 434 N.E.2d 1137, 1141 (111. 1982) (holding
that transfers of property from an individual to his attorney raise a presumption of undue influence, placing the
burden on the attorney to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the gift was not procured through undue
influence); see also Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices-Is Good
Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIo ST. LJ. 57, 60-61 (1984) (addressing the topic of attorneys who are named as
beneficiaries in the wills that they draft and stating that courts are taking an increasingly hard stand against this
type of activity); Leslie A. Evans, Review of Selected 1993 Legislation, Administration of Estates;
Fiduciaries- Self-Dealing, 25 PAC. LJ. 368, 388-90 (1994) (describing the invalidating provisions and the
individuals who are disqualified thereunder as beneficiaries); cf KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-605 (1983)
(invalidating wills written or prepared.by the sole principal beneficiary).
4. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(b)(2)(A)-(C) (West Supp. 1994) (defining blood relation).
5. See CAL FAm. CODE § 6209 (West 1994) (defining a co-habitant as a person who regularly resides
in the household).
6. See CAL PROa. CODE § 21351(b) (amended by Chapter 40) (providing that the transfer will be
allowed if an attorney unrelated to and unassociated with the drafter or beneficiary reviews the instrument,
counsels the transferor regarding the legal ramifications of the transfer, and provides a certificate of
independent review); id. (providing a form of certificate of independent review); see also In re Schuyler, 434
N.E.2d at 1141 (holding that one factor considered when transfers are made by individuals to their attorneys
is whether the transferor received independent advice before completion of the transaction). See generally
Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentary Gifts from Client to the Attorney.Draftsman: From Probate Presumption
to Ethical Prohibition, 66 NE. L. REv. 695 (1987) (discussing different resolutions of the conflict implicit in
situations in which an attorney is designated as a beneficiary of a donative transfer by a client, and stating that
the typical judicial response is a presumption of undue influence because of the fiduciary nature of the
relationship between the parties).
7. CAL PRoB. CODE §21351(a)-(e) (amended by Chapter40); see id. § 21351(a) (amended by Chapter
40) (providing an exception for transfers made by a transferor who is related by blood or marriage to, or is a
cohabitant with, the transferee or the person who drafted or transcribed the instrument, or caused it to be
drafted or transcribed); id. § 21351(b) (amended by Chapter 40) (providing that an instrument is not invalidated
if it is reviewed by an attorney not related to or associated with the drafter or the beneficiary of the transfer,
who counsels the client about the nature of the intended transfer and signs and delivers to the transferor and
the drafter a certificate, the form of which is set forth within § 21351 (b)); id. § 21351(c) (amended by Chapter
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applicable to donative transfers, allowing such transfers to be made to federal,
state, or local public entities8 and to certain tax exempt entities that drafted or
transcribed the instrument Chapter 40 validates the instrument to the extent of
the entity's interest. 10 Chapter 40 further provides for retroactive application to
all instruments that become irrevocable, or are executed by individuals who die,
on or after July 1, 1993.11
Existing law provides that a cause of action which survives the death12 of the
individual against whom it is to be asserted and for which the applicable statute
of limitations has not yet expired can be commenced within one year of death.'
3
Chapter 40 makes applicable to this provision the law pertaining to no-contest
clauses, 14 clarifying that the one year statute of limitations is tolled during the
40) (declaring that a transfer is not invalidated if, after full disclosure of the relationships of the persons
involved, the instrument is approved pursuant to an order under Article 10 (commencing with § 2580) of the
California Probate Code); id. § 21351 (d)-(e) (amended by Chapter 40) (providing that a transfer made on or
before July 1, 1993, will not be invalidated if the court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that
the transfer was not produced by fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence and that it is fair, just, and equitable
to all interested persons to allow the transfer).
8. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 811.2 (West 1980) (defining public entity).
9. CAL PROB. CODE § 21351(f) (amended by Chapter 40); see id. (providing that entities which are
exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) or (19) of the Internal Revenue Code are encompassed under its
provisions); see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 1994) (exempting non-profit organizations from
taxation); id. § 501(c)(19) (West Supp. 1994) (exempting non-profit veteran's organizations from taxation).
10. CAL PROB. CODE § 21351(0 (amended by Chapter 40). See generally SENATE JUDICIARY
COMirIT, COMTnEE ANALYSIS OF AB 797, at 3 (Mar. 8, 1994) (stating that the validation of the instrument
is limited to the extent of the interest of the entity, in order to ensure that the exception still covers and protects
charitable remainders, lead trusts, and pooled income funds).
11. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2135 1(f (amended by Chapter 40).
12. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.20 (West Supp. 1994) (describing survival of causes of action).
13. Id. § 366.2(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 40); see id. § 377.30 (West Supp. 1994) (stating that a cause
of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence it passes to the decedent's successor in
interest); id. § 377.40 (West Supp. 1994) (noting that the decedent's personal representative is subject to suit
to the extent provided by statute); see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 13109 (West 1991) (declaring that a person to
whom the decedent's property is transferred is liable for the unsecured debts of the decedent); id. § 13550
(West 1991) (explaining that the surviving spouse is personally liable for the debts of the deceased spouse
chargeable against the property, subject to the provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure § 13551). See
generally 22 CAL. L. REVIsION COMM'N REP. 895, 921 (1992) (providing that the one-year provision applies
regardless of whether the statute otherwise applicable would have expired before or after the one-year period,
as long as it had not expired at the decedent's death).
14. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21300 (West 1991) (defining a no-contest clause as a provision in an
otherwise valid instrument that, if enforced, would penalize a beneficiary if the beneficiary brings a contest
attacking an instrument or any provision of it); Estate of Goyette v. Diocese of Monterey-Fresno Education
& Welfare Corp., 258 Cal. App. 2d 768, 772, 66 Cal. Rptr. 103, 105 (1968) (defining no-contest clauses as
those which are used to prohibit any legal proceeding designed to thwart the testator's wishes and indicating
that these clauses are enforced according to their terms if clear and certain).
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pendency of the court's determination of whether a particular action constitutes
a contest.'" This provision becomes operative on January 1, 1995.16
Under existing law, when an instrument containing a no-contest clause
becomes irrevocable, a beneficiary may apply to the court for a determination of
whether a motion, petition, or other act by a beneficiary constitutes a contest.
17
Prior law did not specifically provide that claims made by creditors were subject
to the provisions regarding no-contest clauses.'" Chapter 40 clarifies that claims
by creditors are subject to provisions regarding no-contest clauses, providing that
a beneficiary can make a motion to the court to determine if a claim by a creditor
constitutes a contest.19 This provision becomes operative on January 1, 1995.20
Existing law provides that property distributed by a trustee 2tin accordance with
the terms of a trust22 after 120 days from either the notice of rejection' or from
the day the claim was due, whichever is the latter, is not subject to claims asserted
by creditors of the deceased settlor.24 Chapter 40 provides that any time during
which the office of the trustee is vacant is excluded from the time-frame. 5 This
provision becomes operative January 1, 19956
15. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 366.2(b)(3) (amended by Chapter 40); see id. § 366.2(a)(2) (amended by
Chapter 40) (providing that the statute of limitations is not tolled or extended for any reason, except as
provided for in subsection (b)); id. § 366.2(b)(1)-(3) (amended by Chapter 40) (stating that this section remains
subject to provisions relating to creditor claims in administration of estates of decedents, payment of claims,
debts, and expenses from revocable trust of deceased settlor, and no contest clauses); supra note 17 (defining
contest); supra note 14 (defining and discussing no-contest clauses).
16. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 40, sec. 5, at 3983.
17. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21320(a) (amended by Chapter 40); see id § 21300(a) (West 1991) (defining
contest); Estate of Friedman v. Grunauer, 100 Cal. App. 3d 810, 817, 161 Cal. Rptr. 311,315 (1979) (holding
that what constitutes a contest is determined according to the circumstances of each case); Estate of Kazian v.
Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 59 Cal. App. 3d 797, 802, 130 Cal. Rptr. 908, 910 (1976) (stating that what
constitutes a contest is gleaned from considering the purpose the decedent sought to attain by the will
provisions); see also 20 CAL. L. REVISION COWA'N REP., 1001, 1978 (1990) (discussing no contest clauses,
their validity, construction, and procedural aspects); id. at 1981 (stating that since the request for a
determination cannot itself be considered an attack within the parameters of the no-contest clause, the
determination is confined to whether a particular act is considered an attack and does not encompass the merits
of the controversy).
18. 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 79, sec. 14, at 745-46 (enacting CAL. PROB. CODE § 21305).
19. CAL. PRO. CODE § 21320(a) (amended by Chapter 40); see id. §§ 9000,19000 (West 1991 & Supp.
1994) (defining the creditor claims made subject to California Probate Code § 21320).
20. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 40, sec. 5, at 3983.
21. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 84 (West 1991) (defining trustee).
22. See id. § 82 (West 1991) (defining trust).
23. See id. § 19250 (West Supp. 1994) (discussing the ability of a trustee to reject a claim).
24. Id. § 19255 (amended by Chapter 40); see 20 CAL. L. REvisION COMM'N REP. 1001, 1978 (1990)
(describing the procedure for the allowance and rejection of claims against decedent's estates); cf. CAL. PROD.
CODE §§ 9000-9250 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994) (defining the procedures to be used by creditors with claims
against decedent's estates). See generally 11 B.E. WrrtaN, SUsMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Trusts § 274Q (9th
ed. Supp. 1993) (setting forth the provisions governing claims made by creditors against the estate of a
deceased settlor and describing the creditor's claim procedure for claims against revocable trusts as
substantially similar to that for decedent's estates); 18 CAL. L. REviSION COMM'N REP. 595, 596 (1986)
(providing that the procedure for closing off creditor's claims against a trust estate is envisioned as analogous
to the procedure for determining creditor's claims in probate).
25. CAL. PROD. CODE § 19255(d) (amended by Chapter 40).
26. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 40, sec. 5, at 3983.
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INTERPRETWE COMMENT
Existing law precludes certain individuals from being recognized as
beneficiaries of donative transfers and was enacted in order to prevent the
exercise of undue influence over donative transfers of property.27 An unintended
consequence of existing law involved its invalidation of transfers made by
individuals to charitable organizations when the instrument was drafted by an
employee of the charity and used by the donor without consulting an attorney.2
Public policy dictates that individuals should be protected from making transfers
of property induced through undue influence by individuals with whom they
share a fiduciary relationship; however, public policy also dictates that there is a
need to encourage transfers prompted by charitable motivations.29 Consequently,
Chapter 40 was enacted to ensure that particular recipients of transfers are not
disqualified as beneficiaries simply because they drafted the language of the
transferring instrument.3°
Laura J. Fowler
27. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350 (West Supp. 1994); see Evans, supra note 3, at 388-90 (describing the
invalidating provisions and the individuals who are disqualified thereunder as beneficiaries).
28. SENATEJUDICIARYCo)mmErFECOMMfrIEEANALYSISOFAB797, at 2-3 (Mar. 8, 1994).
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id. at 2-3.
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